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Abstract
The perspective that behavior is often driven by unconscious determinants has become widespread in social psychology.
Bargh, Chen, and Burrows’ (1996) famous study, in which participants unwittingly exposed to the stereotype of age walked
slower when exiting the laboratory, was instrumental in defining this perspective. Here, we present two experiments aimed
at replicating the original study. Despite the use of automated timing methods and a larger sample, our first experiment
failed to show priming. Our second experiment was aimed at manipulating the beliefs of the experimenters: Half were led to
think that participants would walk slower when primed congruently, and the other half was led to expect the opposite.
Strikingly, we obtained a walking speed effect, but only when experimenters believed participants would indeed walk
slower. This suggests that both priming and experimenters’ expectations are instrumental in explaining the walking speed
effect. Further, debriefing was suggestive of awareness of the primes. We conclude that unconscious behavioral priming is
real, while real, involves mechanisms different from those typically assumed to cause the effect.
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Introduction
In their seminal series of experiments, Bargh Chen and Burrows
[1] demonstrated that activating a trait construct such as ‘‘being
old’’ is sufficient to elicit behavioral effects in the absence of
awareness. Bargh et al.’s demonstration involved asking partici-
pants to indicate which word was the odd one out amongst an
ensemble of scrambled words a number of which, when
rearranged, form a sentence. Unbeknownst to participants, the
word left out of the sentence was systematically related to the
concept of ‘‘being old’’. The beauty of the experiment lies in its
unusual dependent measure: walking speed. Those participants
who had been exposed to words related to old age walked slower
when exiting the laboratory than the participants who had not
been so exposed. Further, the effect was claimed to occur without
awareness, as participants were found not having noticed the link
between exposure and their behavior [1]. This striking finding,
now widely cited, established that priming may occur automat-
ically and influence behavior with little or no awareness. It
subsequently generated considerable further research in social
psychology [2,3,4,5].
Here, we sought to replicate Bargh et al’s [1] experiments. This
was motivated by three main reasons. The first is simply that the
finding, influential as it is, was only replicated twice so far, with
neither replication being exact. The first replication [6] required
participants to rate the walking speed of a character drawn on a
sheet of paper after they had been primed with extreme exemplars
associated to the concept of ‘‘speed’’ (e.g.: cheetah vs. turtle). The
study found the expected priming effect. However, despite the fact
that both this study and Bargh et al’s share the same theoretical
grounding, the latter only tells us of a bias in judgments of speed,
as it did not require participants to actually perform any behavior.
The second [7] replication aimed at refining Bargh et al’s results
by exploring the substantial variability exhibited by participants in
their priming effect. The authors managed to replicate the results
on walking speed, but the replication, like the original study, can
be questioned based on imprecise timing methods (see below for a
critical description).
Our second motivation was more conceptual. In social
cognition, the assumption that high level semantic priming can
occur automatically and outside of conscious awareness is almost
taken for granted [8]. Yet, this assumption conflicts with
evidences accumulated in cognitive neuroscience. For instance,
several authors [9,10,11] suggest that two factors are necessary to
produce the large patterns of neural activation in higher
association cortices that are essential for semantic priming to
occur: Top-down attention to the prime and bottom-up stimulus
strength (e.g.: its saliency to the participants). Such a pattern of
activation can be the signature of semantic processing of the
prime [12] and is typically associated with conscious awareness
[13]. In Bargh et al.’s experiments 2a and 2b, however, neither of
these features were present. Thus, in view of the semantic
priming literature, the salience of a concept such as ‘‘being old’’
seems too weak to automatically prime a behavior that is further
only indirectly related to old age (i.e., through the concept of
slowness), in the absence of any contextual cues relevant to this
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Wtrait. In Bargh et al.’s account, the association between the
categorical prime (old age) and walking speed (a behavior) is
mediated by the automatic activation a stereotypical trait
(slowness).
The absence of conscious awareness of the relation between the
prime and the behavior is considered as evidence that this
activation is indeed automatic.
Our third motivation is methodological. Some aspects of Bargh
et al.’s [1] experiment’s 2a and 2b remain unspecified yet impinge
on the interpretation of the results. In particular, we see three
potential challenges with the methods of the original study:
First, in the original study, participants’ walking speed was
measured by a confederate posted in the hallway adjacent to the
experiment room. The confederate was unaware of whether a
participant had been primed or not. The purpose of this setup was
to ensure that the experiment was following a double-blind
principle. However, no such precautionary measures are reported
concerning the experimenter who administered the task to the
participants. Numerous studies, however, have indicated that the
experimenter’s expectations can influence participants’ behavior
[14] even in the most controlled experimental environments [15].
In Bargh et al.’s study, the experimenter who administered the task
could thus very well have been aware of whether the participant
was in the prime condition or not and tune his or her behavior
accordingly. This possibility was in fact confirmed informally in
our own study, as we found that it was very easy, even
unintentionally, to discover the condition in which a particular
participant takes part by giving a simple glimpse to the priming
material. Experimenters could thus unwittingly have communi-
cated their expectations to participants [16] and influenced their
walking speed. Thus, given the fact that subtle cues can influence
our behavior [17], controlling for the experimenter’s expectations
appears to be essential.
Second, walking speed was measured using a manual stopwatch
— a method that is prone to error and bias. Manual chronometry
requires extra precautions [7] which appear to be absent from the
original study.
Third, after the experiments, participants were debriefed using
the contingency funnel procedure [18,19] so as to assess, through
increasingly specific questions, (1) whether they were aware of
the purpose of the study and (2) whether they were aware of
the fact that the words used in the scrambled sentences task were
related to the concept of old age. Only 1 out of 19 participants
[1] (p.237) were found to be aware of the influence of the primes,
— a finding that formed the basis for the claim that the effect
of stereotype activation on behavior is unconscious. However,
it remains unclear exactly what participants claimed to be
unaware of. As Nisbett and Wilson [20] famously pointed out,
participants can remain (1) unaware of the stimulus, (2) unaware
of their response, or (3) unaware of the fact that the stimulus
importantly influenced the response. Thus, we set out to improve
on the tests of awareness originally used by Bargh et al. [1] in
hopes of better delineating exactly what people were aware of in
this situation.
In the following, we report on two studies aimed specifically at
replicating the original findings while improving on its design and
exploring the extent to which the experimenter’s own expectan-
cies may influence the results. In Experiment 1, we sought to
replicate the original study but used automated rather than
manual chronometry. In Experiment 2, we directly manipulated
experimenters’ expectancies by making half of the experimenters
think their participants would slow down after exposure and the
other half think that their participants would speed up after
exposure.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants. 120 undergraduate Belgian French speaking
students (age range 20–34 years of age, average 21.9) took part in
Experiment 1. Four experimenters were recruited for this
experiment (age range 21–24 years of age, average 22.5). This
experiment was a mandatory component of a practical course in
psychology and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Department of Psychological Sciences of the University of
Brussels. Participants gave verbal informed consent to participate
in this study, for which no particular written consent form was
necessary, as they already had provided a general consent for the
course to the Faculty of Psychology. This procedure was
specifically approved by the Ethics Committee mentioned above.
Procedure and Design. Participants were told that they had
to take part in a test of their French linguistic skills.
The design replicated Bargh et al.’s [1] study and took place in
an empty hallway located on a vacant floor of a Universite ´ Libre
de Bruxelles building. The hallway, a long featureless corridor, led
to the experimental room. Two infrared sensors were hidden in
the hallway, separated by the same distance as in the original study
(9.75 m). The recording of the sensors signal was started before a
participant arrived and was stopped upon full completion of all
tasks. Participants were clearly directed to the end of the corridor
to avoid any wandering and crossed each beam on each passage.
There were two conditions defined by which version of the
scrambled sentences task, the ‘‘Prime’’ and the ‘‘No-Prime’’
version, was used.
The Prime version consisted of 30 scrambled sentences [21] all
including a word related to the concept of old age either directly
translated from Bargh et al. [1] or adapted to French. To adapt
the items, we conducted an online survey (80 participants) in
which participants had to report 10 adjectives related to the
concept of old age. Only the most frequent responses were used as
replacement words. The word used as a prime could be put in a
semantic context (e.g.: ‘‘always/worried/is/he/house/’’ for ‘‘he is
always worried’’) or not (e.g.: ‘‘piece/grey/of/Friday/fabric/a’’
for ‘‘a piece of grey fabric’’). To complete the task, participants
had to rearrange 30 scrambled sentences consisting of 4 to 5 words
in the correct order and cross out the word that would not fit in the
sentence (see supporting material S1 for a complete list of stimuli).
There was no time limit to complete the task.
The No-Prime version of the task was exactly identical to the
Prime version except that each word related to the concept of old
age was replaced by a neutral word.
Participants were randomly and blindly assigned to either the
Prime or the No-Prime condition. Experimenters were randomly
recruited among students and had neither prior expectations
toward participants behavior nor knowledge of the original
experiment [1]. Each experimenter randomly tested participants
from both conditions and was instructed to interact with each
participant according to a strict script so that their potential
influence was minimized. Experimenters remained in the room
throughout the whole task. The questionnaires were enclosed in an
envelope that the participant had to open, so as to keep each
experimenter blind to the participant’s condition. Upon comple-
tion of the scrambled sentences task, participants were thanked
and dismissed. They then walked towards the exit through the
hallway. In doing so, they triggered the infrared beams and their
walking speed was subsequently computed.
Before reaching the exit, participants were called back by the
experimenter who pretended that he/she had forgotten to
administer a final task. The debriefing that followed relied on a
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manipulation on three levels:
1-Awareness of the prime was assessed by asking
participants increasingly specific questions about the
presence of primes in the scrambled sentences. One
particular question was a four-alternative forced-choice
task (4-AFC) in which participants were required to
choose between four pictures representing four social
categories that could have been used as primes (i.e.:
athletic person, Arabic person, handicapped person and
elderly).
2-Awareness of the primed behavior was assessed by
inviting participants to indicate how much they thought
their walking speed had increased or decreased relative
to their regular walking speed (responses were provided
using an on-screen slider along a scale ranging from 0 to
100, with 50 representing their regular walking speed).
3-Awareness of the link between the prime and the
primed behavior was assessed directly by asking
participants whether they had noticed any link between
the scrambled sentences task and their walking speed as
they had left the room.
The debriefing was also used to probe suspicion regarding the
purpose of the experiment by asking increasingly accurate
questions such as: ‘‘Do you think this experiment is related to
any topic in particular?’’, ‘‘Do you think this experiment could be
related with manipulating behavior?’’.
Results
Walking speed. In this analysis, we used participants’
walking speed as they entered the experiment room, (i.e., before
priming) as a covariate. The results show no significant difference
between the Prime (M=6.270 SD=2.15) and the No-Prime group
(M=6.390 SD=1.11) in the time necessary to walk along the
hallway after the priming manipulation (F (1, 119),1, g
2=.01).
Awareness of the prime. No participant reported having
noticed anything unusual about the scrambled sentences task. Four
participants (6.66%) in the Prime condition reported that the
sentences were related to the stereotype of old persons. We tested
the distribution of forced choices for both conditions using a two
independent sample chi-squared test: the Prime group chose the
picture of the old person above chance level whereas the No prime
group was equally likely to choose all four pictures (x2 (1)=5.43,
p=0.023).
Awareness of the effect. We computed the deviation of the
slider from the initial position. No significant difference was found
between the Prime (M=1.7) and the No-Prime (M=2.68) groups
(t (1, 119),1, d=0.022).
Awareness of the link. 96% of participants reported that
they could not establish a link between the scrambled sentences
task and their subsequent behavior.
No experimenter reported having entertained any specific
expectation about participants’ behavior.
Discussion
Despite our large sample of 120 participants (vs. 60 in Bargh
et al.’s study 2a and 2b combined), and despite our precise
measurement methods, we were unable to replicate the effects
observed by Bargh et al. [1]. Further, and again in contrast to
Bargh et al., the 4-AFC task we used revealed that participants
showed a certain degree of awareness of the prime.
Based on these negative results, we decided to push the
investigation further and elucidate the factors that could
potentially promote Bargh et al’s [1] effect on walking speed. A
first possibility is simply that the effects observed by Bargh et al.
results from a methodological artifact originating from the lack of
accuracy of their time measurement method. There is also a
second, more intriguing possibility. Studies [22] on automatic
behavior have suggested that participants tend to mimic the
experimenter’s behavior. Therefore, it seemed plausible that
experimenters’ expectations about primed participants’ behavior
may have altered their own behavior (e.g.: slower interaction pace
with the participants and gesture) and that these changes were
communicated unconsciously by experimenters to the participants.
Thus, an alternative explanation for Bargh et al’s findings could be
that participants adapt their behavior to their experimenters’
expectations and hence walk slower as a result of a self-fulfilling
prophecy [14].
Thus, as proposed by Dehaene et al’s [9] framework,
experimenters’ expectations could act as an amplifier of the effect
of the prime and thus promote the primed behavior.
To test these possibilities, we conducted a second experiment in
which we manipulated the experimenters’ expectations about
primed participants’ behavior. To assess the possible effects of the
chronometry method, we also asked our experimenters to use a
stopwatch in addition to the infrared sensors. .
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants. 50 new participants (age range 18–30 years,
average 21.3) took part in Experiment 2. 10 participants (age
range 20–24 year, average 21.7) were also recruited as
experimenters. This experiment was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Psychological Sciences of the
University of Brussels.
Procedure and design. In Experiment 2, we used the exact
same design and procedure as in Experiment 1. However, two
fundamental modifications were implemented.
Experimenters’ expectations. Experimenters’ expectations
about primed participants’ behavior were manipulated. One half
of the experimenters were told that the primed participant would
walk slower as result of the prime (i.e.: ‘‘Slow’’ condition), the
other half were told that the participants would walk faster (i.e.:
‘‘Fast’’ condition). Each individual experimenter tested 5
participants randomly assigned to the Prime or the No-Prime
condition. Experimenters’ expectations were shaped through a
one hour briefing and persuasion session prior to the first
participant’s session. In addition, the first participant whom an
experimenter tested was a confederate who had been covertly
instructed to act in the manner expected expected by the
experimenter. Crucially, participants’ condition (i.e.: Prime or
No-Prime) was made salient to the experimenter. As in
Experiment 1, the experimenters were instructed to follow a
strict script to standardize their interactions with the participants
and not to reveal to the participant the expected result of the
prime on their subsequent behavior.
Experimenters’ beliefs about the experimental set up and effect
of the prime on the participants were assessed upon completion of
their testing session.
Timings. As in Experiment 1, we used the infrared gate to
measure participants’ walking speed (hereafter, ‘‘objective
timing’’). However, the equipment was presented to the
experimenters as experimental hardware that was so far
unreliable and that needed further calibration. Therefore, we
Behavioral Priming Reexamined
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using a manual stopwatch (hereafter, ‘‘subjective timing’’).
Results
To examine possible dependencies between observations due to
the experimenter, we computed the intraclass coefficient for each
of the key dependent variables. As this coefficient was always very
low and not significantly different from 0 (p..30), all observations
were treated as independent [23].
In subsequent analyses, we distinguish three components in the
timings. The subjective timings reflect the behavior of the
experimenter measuring participants’ walking speed. The objec-
tive data provided by the infrared sensors is a pure measure of
participants’ walking speed. The absolute difference between the
subjective and the objective data is the absolute error and
constitutes a measure of experimenters’ accuracy.
Concerning subjective timing data, Figure 1 shows that for
subjective timings, participants in the Prime (M=7.250 SD=.33)
condition walked significantly slower than those in the No-Prime
(M=6.730 SD=.32) condition when tested by an experimenter
expecting the primed participants to be slower (F(1, 24)=12,32,
p=.002, g
2=.339). This result replicates Bargh et al. [1] effect
on walking speed. Strikingly however, as indicated by the
significant interaction between participants’ condition6experi-
menters’ condition (F(3, 46)=18,82, p,.001, g
2=.295), the
effect was reversed in the Fast experimenters condition, so that
Primed participants (M=5.80 SD=.73) walked faster than No-
Prime participants (M=6,430 SD=.4) (F(1, 24)=7,55, p=.012,
g
2=.274).
In terms of objective timing (see Figure 2), we observed a
difference between the Prime (M=6.950 SD=.36) and the No-
Prime group (M=6.520 SD=.31) remains for the slow experi-
menter condition (F(1, 24)=7.07, p=.014, g
2=.228). Bargh et al’s
[1]effectisthus replicatedinthiscondition. Therewas nodifference
between the Prime (M=6.070 SD=.57) and the No-Prime
(M=6.010 SD=.39) group (F(1, 24)=.231, p=.636, g
2=.011)
in the fast experimenter condition. Finally, we also found a
main effect of the experimenters’ condition was found:
participants tested by experimenters in the Slow condition
(M=6.750 SD=.43) were slower than those tested by
experimenters in the Fast condition (M=6.040 SD=.47) (F(1,
49)=30.44, p,.001, g
2=.404).
Turning now to the differences between objective and
subjective timing data, which reflect experimenters’ accuracy,
Figure 3 shows that the reverse effect on walking speed for the
Fast experimenter condition is explained by the absolute error:
Experimenters in the Fast condition are less accurate for the No-
Prime group (M=.410 SD=.24) than for the Prime group
(M=.730 SD=.38) (F(1, 24)=5.819, p=.023, g
2=.183). No
significant difference was found between the Prime (M=0.30
SD=.17) and the No-Prime (M=0.490 SD=.32) groups (F(1,
24)=3.297, p=.08, g
2=.113) in the Slow condition. Overall,
the error level is the same for all groups, but for the No-Prime
group in the Fast condition (F(49, 1)=9.094, p=.004,
g
2=.144).
Awareness of the prime. As in Experiment 1, analysis of
responses to the forced choice questionnaire shows that the Prime
group, over both experimenters’ conditions, chooses the picture of
the old person above chance level. In contrast, the No-prime
group is equally likely to choose any of the four pictures (x2
(1)=5.62, p=0.019).
Awareness of the effect. A significant difference was found
between the Prime (M of the deviation=27.3 SD=1.35) and the
No-Prime (M of the deviation=2.01 SD=.87) group (F(1,
24)=12.43, p=.042, g
2=.143) in the Slow experimenters’
condition. No significant difference was found between the
Prime (M of the deviation=2.23 SD=.93) and the No-Prime
group (M of the deviation=3.12 SD=1.05) in the Fast
experimenters’ condition (F(1, 24)=.56, p=.38, g
2=.015).
Figure 1. Subjective timings. Mean time in seconds to walk down the hallway measured manually by the experimenter. The error bars represent
the standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029081.g001
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scrambled sentences task and their subsequent behavior could be
made, 95% of participants in the Prime condition answered no.
When assessed at the end of the experiment, every experimenter
reported a high degree of belief in the cover story they were told in
the pre-experimental briefing.
Discussion
Can Bargh et al.’s [1] striking finding that walking speed can be
influenced by unconscious primes associated with the stereotype of
‘‘old age’’ be replicated? Experiment 1, in which we used better
timing methods, yielded null results. In Experiment 2, however,
we were indeed able to replicate Bargh et al.’s priming effect, but
Figure 2. Objective timings. Mean time in seconds to walk down the hallway measured by the infrared sensors. The error bars represent the
standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029081.g002
Figure 3. Error level. Absolute difference in seconds between the subjective and the objective timings. The error bars represent the standard error
of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029081.g003
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walk slower after having being primed. We observed the effect
regardless of whether the chronometry method was objective or
subjective. Strikingly, we were also able to reverse this effect in the
subjective timings when the experimenters expected the primed
participants to walk faster. Thus, if our experiment had used
subjective timings only, as in Bargh et al’s original study, we would
have erroneously concluded that experimenters’ expectations was
a critical factor for the priming effect to occur. But the objective
timings show otherwise. The reverse priming effect on walking
speed observed on subjective timings stems from errors committed
while operating the stopwatch: Experimenters in the fast condition
were prone to commit more errors because they expected the need
to capture a fast event and hence tended to be inaccurate in
stopping the watch.
As in Experiment 1 we observed the same pattern of result
regarding the awareness test. For the most part, primed
participants were able to recall the concept related to the
scrambled sentences task. Interestingly, primed participants in
the Slow condition (i.e. those who actually walked slower as a
result of the experimental manipulation) were to a certain degree
aware of their diminished walking speed.
Discussion
Our findings lead us to reconsider the results of Bargh et al’s [1]
experiments 2a and 2b with a critical eye and to consider their
implications for nonconscious behavioral priming;
First, in Experiment 1, despite the use of a larger sample and an
experimental procedure devoid of the limitations present in the
original experiment, we were not able to replicate Bargh et al’s [1]
automatic effect of priming on walking speed. This led us to
assume that crucial factors in this paradigm had remained
unidentified. Experiment 2 was aimed at exploring such factors.
Second, in Experiment 2 we were indeed able to obtain the
priming effect on walking speed for both subjective and objective
timings. Crucially however, this was only possible by manipulating
experimenters’ expectations in such a way that they would expect
primed participants to walk slower. Our results, however, cannot
be explained solely in terms of a pure self-fulfilling prophecy effect
[14], as the primed participants did not walk faster when tested by
an experimenter who believed they would walk faster. Therefore it
seems that the primes alone are not sufficient and must be in line
with environmental cues such as the experimenters’ behavior in
order to elicit the effect on walking speed. This is also supported by
the fact that contrary factors (i.e.: primes related to the concept of
age in conjunction with an experimenter expecting to observer a
faster walking speed) did not alter participants’ walking speed.
Regarding the subjective timings, we obtained a reverse effect
on walking speed (i.e.: participants walking faster). This effect can
be explained by the error committed by the experimenters, most
likely as a result of their induced expectations. If we had used only
human-operated measurement devices, as in Bargh et al.’s [1]
experiment 2a and 2b, we would thus have erroneously concluded
in a reverse priming effect. This very important point suggests that
one must be cautious about (1) the type of measurement used in
behavioral priming experiments as well as (2) the experimenters
expectations. Subtle differences are particularly prone to external
influences and potential biases.
Third, most of the participants primed with the scrambled
sentences task were aware of the social category they had been
primed with. This result shows that one must be cautious when
using the scrambled sentences task as a priming method. One must
take into account that our participants were performing the
experiment as part of a psychology course, which could have led to
higher suspicion towards the scrambled sentences task resulting in
a higher degree of awareness of the primes. Additionally, those
participants who actually exhibited a slower walking speed
reported in good proportion being aware of that particular
behavior. Whether automatic behavioral priming can occur
without awareness thus remains unclear. As a matter of fact,
participants’ awareness of the prime and of the primed behavior
could have led them to exert better conscious control over the
latter and therefore impair its expression.
Finally, priming alone was not sufficient to promote a priming
effect on walking speed comparable to Bargh et al’s [1]. We also
had to manipulate experimenters’ beliefs so that they would expect
the primed subjects to walk slower. This finding is congruent with
recent evidence showing that primed behavior is sensitive to the
context in which it takes place [24,25]. The present finding can be
seen in the same light. Experimenters’ expectations seem to
provide a favorable context to the behavioral expression of the
prime. Obviously, this interpretation remains tentative, as we do
not know how this process operates. However, it is likely that
experimenters who expect their participants to walk slower behave
differently than those who expect their participants to walk faster
and that such behavioral cues are picked up by participants.
In conclusion, although automatic behavioral priming seems
well established in the social cognition literature, it seems
important to consider its limitations. In line with our result it
seems that these methods need to be taken as an object of research
per se before using it can be considered as an established
phenomenon.
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